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Bill committees have long been a fundamental feature of legislative scrutiny in the 
British House of Commons.  The recent introduction  of oral evidence sessions as a 
standard bill committee  procedure has further underlined  their importance.1 Yet 
despite  their prominence in parliamentary  life, bill committees have been  some- 
what  under-studied. A comparison  of bill committee  activity in the  first decade 
of the twenty-first century with the last comprehensive  examination  undertaken 
in 1974 shows that significant changes  have taken place; bill committees appear 
to be working harder than ever before but this is not reflected in terms of the rela- 
tive impact they are making on government legislation. 
 
 
 
A Member of Parliament from the late nineteenth century would be quite familiar 
with a contemporary House of Commons bill committee.2  Despite procedural 
innovations3  and changes in the size and membership of committees, the proce- 
dures and terminology used when moving, withdrawing and voting upon amend- 
ments has not changed from that established by William Gladstone.4  The last 
comprehensive study of government legislation undertaken by John Griffith in 
 
1 In the 2006 – 2007 parliamentary session, bill committees were renamed ‘public bill committees’ and 
given the capacity to take oral and written evidence. 
2 The term ‘bill committee’ has been in use following procedural reforms introduced during the 2006 – 
2007 parliamentary session when such committees were renamed as ‘public  bill committees’.  Bill 
committees had previously been known by the term ‘standing committees’. 
3 For example, the introduction  of oral evidence sessions in 2006 and the use of programming  to 
curtail debate on amendments. 
4 For a more detailed history of the development of bill committees in the House of Commons, see 
Walkland (1979). 
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1974 demonstrated the extent of legislative scrutiny undertaken by modern bill 
committees and gave substantive evidence to common assertions about bill com- 
mittee performance, highlighting for example the improbability of the govern- 
ment accepting opposition  or backbench amendments to their bills. Although 
no comparable analysis has been undertaken since Griffith’s study, these asser- 
tions about bill committee work and performance continue to endure, despite 
the lack of modern  quantitative evidence. This research contrasts the work of 
bill committees detailed by Griffith in his famous study, with comparable data 
collected from bill committees in the first decade of the twenty-first century. 
 
 
1.    Lack of modern comprehensive analysis 
 
Writing about modern legislative studies in the mid-1990s, Kaare Strøm (1995) 
spoke of bill committees as having received ‘the most intensive and painstaking 
scholarly attention’ of any of the internal features of legislatures (p. 65). One 
would therefore expect a plethora of work on bill committees in the House of 
Commons.  Yet in the British case such work has been largely absent. Whilst 
the procedural aspects of bill committees are covered in detail in practical text- 
books on the British Parliament (see for example Rogers and Walters, 2006), 
only a handful of works have concentrated on bill committee output. Indeed, a 
recent review of literature on the policy impact of the British Parliament went 
so far as to state that scholars seem to ‘treat the UK as if it lacked legislative com- 
mittees altogether’ (Russell and Benton, 2009, p. 8). 
There are two principal and overlapping gaps in the literature on House of 
Commons bill committees: a lack of extensive empirical research and a lack of 
contemporary research. Despite over a century of bill committee proceedings, ex- 
tensive empirical research is limited to only two studies: that of John Griffith, who 
examined in detail the passage of all government bills across three parliamentary 
sessions between 1967 and 1971 in his famous Parliamentary Scrutiny of Govern- 
ment Bills (1974) and the work of Burton and Drewry (1981), who offered a 
similar though less comprehensive study of selected government bills between 
1970 and 1974. John Griffith’s (1974) work is particularly important as it consti- 
tuted the first systematic study and coding of such a large number of legislative 
amendments, with the aim of illustrating both the ‘quality as well as the quantity 
of the impact’ of Parliament (p. 14). Although his work did not consider bill com- 
mittees in isolation, the analysis of committee stage in the House of Commons is 
by far the most comprehensive element, accounting for over one-third  of the 
published volume. It would be unfair to suggest that bill committees have been 
ignored by contemporary researchers. Studies by Kalitowski (2008) and Russell 
and Johns (2007) as well as a series of reports by the Hansard Society (1993), 
Brazier et al. (2008) and Fox and Korris (2010) have demonstrated  the impact 
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of bill committees on government bills. However, these constitute in-depth case 
studies of specific bills; the 1993 report  of The Hansard  Society for example 
includes case studies of the Broadcasting Act (1990) and the Dangerous Dogs 
Act  (1990),  detailing  the  number  of  amendments  discussed, accepted  and 
defeated in committee. There is as yet no modern published work comparable 
with that of Griffith in terms of documenting  both the descriptive features of 
bill committee work and their impact on government bills across parliamentary 
sessions.5 
It is perhaps no surprise that bill committees remain under studied; there has 
long been a perception among academics that they offer little useful material. 
Walkland (1979)  for example describes them  as ‘ritualised’  (p.  251), whilst 
Kelso (2009) notes that they have simply ‘preserved executive strength’, reflecting 
the executive’s view of Parliament as a ‘legislative machine’ (p. 36). Even Griffith 
(1974) himself noted that they can be ‘tedious and time-wasting’ (p. 52). There is 
a perception that they add no value to the scrutiny of legislation. Descriptions of 
bill committees as being merely replicas of the House of Commons chamber have 
long dominated the literature. Young (1962, p. 156) refers to them as simply ‘an 
extension of the House’ and more recently both Griffith and Ryle (1989, p. 270) 
and Blackburn and Kennon (2003, p. 385) describe them as ‘the House in mini- 
ature’. Yet only by undertaking such an analysis can one be certain as to whether 
these perceptions still hold true. Bill committees may be a much disregarded 
feature of the legislative process, but  they are an enduring  feature. As such, 
they deserve a modern hearing. 
The key concept to be considered when evaluating the work of legislatures is 
that of control (Beer 1996, p. 71) or constraint (Blondel et al., 1970). What is im- 
portant is not simply the capacity of legislatures to influence legislation but the 
actual exercise of this power (Mezey, 1979, p. 25 and Norton,  1990, pp. 177 – 
180). It is necessary therefore to measure the extent to which committees make 
changes to government legislation, with or without government consent. The 
key features for comparison thus include basic quantitative measures of impact 
regarding  the  number  of  amendments  moved  or  discussed  by  committee 
members and the proportion accepted by the government or agreed to on a div- 
ision. Quantitative measures of legislative impact are useful but can be misleading 
if considered in isolation. Indeed, qualitative analysis has come to be seen as in- 
creasingly important  in order ‘to understand what really goes on in committees’ 
(Arter, 2003, p. 86). Only by adding a qualitative dimension is it possible to gauge 
the true extent of committee impact. An estimation of the content of successful 
 
 
5 It should be noted here that current research being undertaken by Meg Russell and Meghan Benton at 
the Constitution  Unit will add further comprehensive data to that which we currently know about 
modern bill committees. 
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amendments  made  to  government  bills in  committee  is a further  necessary 
element when comparing the ability of committees to influence the content of 
government bills. 
One further focus for analysis in the context of bill committees is the impact of 
committee stage later on in the legislative process. Described by academics as a 
‘milder  influence’  (Blondel et al., 1970, p. 79) or simply ‘the  labour that goes 
on behind the scenes’ (Jennings, 1948, p. 492), this includes the introduction 
of government amendments at the report stage of a bill in response to undertak- 
ings given by the minister in committee. Although the focus here is on the passage 
of government legislation through  the House of Commons, the impact of bill 
committees has also been demonstrated during the passage of bills through the 
House of Lords (Russell and Johns, 2007; Kalitowski, 2008). Similar quantitative 
and qualitative measurements of the impact of bill committees at the report stage 
are also necessary in order to appreciate the true impact of bill committees on 
government legislation. 
 
 
2.    Methodology 
 
This research compares quantitative data on the scrutiny of government bills by 
bill committees between 2000 and 2010 with that compiled by John Griffith in his 
1974 study. Whilst Griffith considered every government bill across three parlia- 
mentary sessions,6 a purposive sample of 139 bills is used here, focusing on bills 
which were explicitly listed in the Queen’s Speech at the start of each parliamen- 
tary session. Scrutiny taking place in committees of the whole House has been 
excluded.7 In line with the approach taken by Griffith, the official transcript of 
each bill committee  provided  the  basis for data  collection. All amendments 
moved or grouped and discussed in committee were coded. The mover, position 
and  party were coded, alongside the  outcome;  whether the amendment  was 
passed, withdrawn, negatived without a division or negatived following a div- 
ision. New clauses and  new schedules were coded in  the  same manner  and 
included in the overall amendment count. 
There are some limitations with this approach. Most obviously, data collection 
relies upon  the correct listing of amendments  and proceedings in the Official 
Report. Whilst Griffith used hard copies of proceedings, this research was com- 
piled using material published on the parliamentary website. Online material 
regarding amendment  lists and committee proceedings is much more detailed 
in very recent parliamentary sessions than for those at the start of the study. It 
 
6 A total of 111 bills were examined by Griffith (1974, p. 32). 
 
7 Although Griffith does consider scrutiny carried out in committees of the whole House, he presents 
this data separately throughout. 
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is thus easier to ensure the accuracy regarding the authorship of amendments for 
later sessions within the sample. The research is inevitably limited by human 
error; both within the coding of amendments and within the presentation of pro- 
ceedings in the Official Report itself. However, these limitations were also preva- 
lent within the 1974 study. Griffith (1974) himself notes that  the notices of 
amendments and minutes of committee proceedings do not ‘yield the full infor- 
mation’ (p. 259) and on several occasions corrects mistakes which have been 
made by Hansard (see, for example, 1974, p. 144). 
In addition to the basic descriptive coding of amendments, Griffith’s (1974) 
work provided another angle to the outcome of amendments in bill committees. 
Rather than focusing solely on the passage of amendments on a formal level, he 
additionally  coded  for  what  he  described  as  ‘assurances  and  undertakings’ 
(p. 119) from ministers. He lists six such undertakings from ministers in commit- 
tee and codes for occasions where amendments have been withdrawn as a result of 
these assurances.8 These six undertakings fall into three main categories. Firstly, 
promises to make a change to the regulations or guidance accompanying a bill or 
regarding its implementation. Here a minister has agreed with the principle of the 
amendment in question, but does not feel it necessary to include it in statute le- 
gislation. Such undertakings are an important  feature of bill committees, yet 
would not feature in a simple count of successful amendments. Also included 
in this category are commitments to address the issue raised by an amendment 
in an alternative piece of legislation. Secondly, promises to reflect or reconsider 
an amendment  which has been moved in committee. This is not a guarantee 
of action, merely an agreement to give further thought to an amendment with 
ministerial colleagues, officials and on occasion with outside organisations. The 
third  category includes commitments  to  table an  amendment  at the  Report 
Stage in response to a committee amendment.  This may be due to necessary 
redrafting  of  an  amendment   tabled  by  an  opposition   or  backbench  MP 
without  the  benefit of parliamentary  draftsmen  or  that  the  government  has 
agreed with the majority, but not all of the amendment or new clause tabled. 
All amendments within the 2000 – 2010 sample were coded in line with these 
three categories of ministerial undertaking. This enables descriptive statistics to 
be compiled which are directly comparable to Griffith’s study; the process for 
coding amendments is essentially the same. As a result, it is possible to illustrate 
the changes to the scrutiny of legislation by bill committees over the last 30 years. 
When analysing the data collected it must be remembered that Griffith’s sample 
 
 
8 These are listed as ministerial promise to look again, ministerial promise to table own amendment, 
ministerial  promise  to  reconsider  favourably, minister  promise  to  meet  point  administratively, 
ministerial promise to meet point by regulations, ministerial promise to meet point in different bill 
(Griffith, 1974, p. 122). 
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covers just three parliamentary sessions, with the inclusion of a greater number of 
bills in each session. Whilst the raw data are used to illustrate the differences that 
have occurred between the two studies, it is often more accurate for comparative 
purposes to express the data as an average per bill. 
Griffith illustrated  his  quantitative  findings extensively with  commentary 
taken directly from the official transcripts of bill committee proceedings. This ap- 
proach is also replicated here. In addition, the recent sample has been supplemen- 
ted with a series of interviews with Members of Parliament.9  These interviews 
focused on Members’ general impressions of bill committees but also enabled 
the probing of specific bill committees and amendments, allowing greater elabor- 
ation and detail than is possible from committee transcripts alone. Where rele- 
vant,   material   from   these  interviews  and   the   accompanying  committee 
transcripts is used to qualify the quantitative findings. 
 
 
3.    Comparing the workload of bill committees 
 
The workload of bill committees has increased substantially since the 1960s and 
1970s. This can be seen in both the length of time allocated for committee scru- 
tiny and in the number of amendments being moved and discussed. Legislative 
committees  are  spending  much  longer  scrutinising  government  bills and  a 
much   higher  number   of  amendments   are  being  moved  or  discussed  in 
committee. 
 
 
3.1   Committees are scrutinising bills for longer 
 
Bill committee work is often derided by Members of the House who complain 
about the long sitting hours. Government backbenchers in particular speak of 
particularly arduous committees. Despite the changes made to sitting hours in 
recent years, modern bill committees are actually spending a greater amount of 
time  scrutinising bills than  previously. Whilst Griffith’s (1974) data  suggests 
that committees spent an average of 18 hours scrutinising a single government 
bill in  the  1969 – 1971 sessions (p.  17),10   this  has risen to  24 hours  for  the 
2000 – 2010 sessions. Although possibly a response to the growing size of govern- 
ment bills rather than an indication of a greater commitment  to scrutiny, bill 
committees are accounting  for a greater amount  of parliamentary time than 
previously. 
 
9 Twenty-one interviews were carried out with Members of Parliament including government and 
opposition frontbench and backbench committee members between February 2010 and October 2011. 
10 Total time per session was listed by Griffith as follows: 1967 – 1968 (814.36 hours),  1968 – 1969 
(352.20 hours), 1970 – 1971 (478.47 hours). 
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One particularly long committee was the Company Law Reform Bill of the 
2006 – 2007 session, the  longest bill ever introduced  in  the  House. Speaking 
about the length of time, the bill spent in committee and the fact that the govern- 
ment minister had to bring her young child with her to all of the sittings, one 
participant  noted  that  ‘so  long  were our  deliberations  that  the  young  girl 
learned to walk’ .11  The evidence contrasts to the perceptions of Members them- 
selves. When interviewed one opposition MP commented that ‘committees lasted 
a hell of a lot longer [in the early 1990s] than they do now’.12  This is perhaps 
simply a response to the fall in the number of late night or through the night sit- 
tings. Although not  completely removed from modern  bill committees,13   the 
number  of late night  sittings has fallen significantly as bill committees now 
occupy more family friendly sitting hours on a more routine basis. Where it is 
felt that progress on a bill has been slow, afternoon sittings are usually extended 
but rarely go beyond 10.00 p.m. 
 
 
 
 
3.2   The number of amendments discussed in committee has increased 
 
Griffith (1974) stated that ‘in considering amendments moved to a bill, what is 
important  is their relative effect on the bill, not their number’ (p. 14). But the 
number of amendments tabled by committee members offers a very useful illus- 
tration of how the work of bill committees has changed. He cites the number of 
non-government amendments as averaging 1402 per session between 1967 and 
1971 (1974, p. 75). This equates to an average of 46 amendments per bill.14  As 
Table 1  demonstrates,  modern  bill committees  have exceeded this  number. 
When it is considered that Griffith’s figures included all amendments listed on 
the  Order  Paper,  not  simply  the  number  which  were  actually  moved  or 
grouped and discussed within committee, the increase in the number of amend- 
ments being considered by modern  bill committees is even more prominent, 
averaging 1747 amendments  per  session or  125 amendments  per  bill. The 
number being formally moved or discussed in modern committees is thus cur- 
rently over twice the average number  of all amendments  listed on the Order 
Paper for bills in Griffith’s sample. 
 
11 Vera Baird, 1st Sitting, Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Bill Committee, 15 March 2007, col. 4. 
 
12 Opposition MP (13 October 2010), interview with the author. 
 
13 The 16th sitting of the Apprenticeships, Skills, Children and Learning Bill Committee in the 2008 – 
2009 session for example, lasted over 16 hours, with the committee sitting until 4.30 am despite a full 
day being left in the programme. 
14 Calculated from the figures listed by Griffith in pages 49 (number of government bills committed to 
standing committee per session) and 75 (number of amendments). 
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bill 
% Total Average per 
bill 
% Total Average per 
bill 
% 
 
1967 – 
 
861 
 
8 
 
21 
 
392 
 
4 
 
9 
 
2832 
 
26 
 
69 
2000 – 
2010 
7322 53 30 1242 9 5 15,881 114 65 
 
 
Table  1  Amendments moved or grouped  for discussion in committee 
 
Parliamentary session     Number of amendments discussed in committee 
 
Non-government 
amendments 
Government amendments 
 
 Total % Average per  bill  Total % Average per  bill 
 
2000 – 2001 
 
1023 
 
82 
 
85  
 
227 
 
18 
 
19 
2001 – 2002 1588 62 122 
 
969 38 75 
2002 – 2003 3114 71 208 
 
1265 29 84 
2003 – 2004 2189 67 122 
 
1074 33 60 
2004 – 2005 686 84 114 
 
129 16 22 
2005 – 2006 3169 71 113 
 
1286 29 46 
2006 – 2007 1381 71 92 
 
565 29 38 
2007 – 2008 2020 66 126 
 
1024 34 64 
2008 – 2009 1591 70 145 
 
671 30 61 
2009 – 2010 707 86 118 
 
112 14 19 
Average 1747 70 125 
 
732 30 53 
NB: All figures are rounded  to nearest  whole number. 
 
 
Table  2  Government  and opposition  amendments in committee 
 
Period       Position of MP moving or tabling amendment 
 
Government 
frontbench 
Government 
backbench 
Opposition 
 
 
 
 
 
1971a 
 
 
 
NB: All figures have been  rounded  to nearest  whole number. 
aFigures adapted from Griffith (1974), p. 87. 
 
 
It is helpful to illustrate this point further by considering the proportion  of 
amendments moved by government and opposition members. Table 2 shows that 
whilst the number  of government backbench amendments  has doubled  to an 
average of 9 per bill, the number of opposition amendments has seen over a fourfold 
increase, rising from an average of 26 per bill in the Griffith study to 114 today. 
However, perhaps the most striking feature of both tables is the large number 
of government amendments being moved in modern bill committees. Griffith’s 
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figures suggest that the government made an average of eight amendments to 
their bills in committee between 1967 and 1971. This rises to an average of 53 
per bill in the 2000 – 2010 period. Twenty-first century governments are therefore 
making over six times as many amendments to their own bills. 
Contemporary  bill committees are thus responsible for considering a much 
larger number  of amendments, regardless of their authorship.  The increase in 
the number of government amendments accounts for a considerable proportion 
of this increase and suggests that modern governments are under greater pressure 
to expedite legislation through the House. The rise in the number of opposition 
amendments being tabled and discussed in committee is equally significant. Op- 
position MPs appear—on paper at least—to be engaging in more in-depth scru- 
tiny of legislation. With very few resources at their disposal to assist with the 
drafting of such a large number  of amendments,  it is likely that  preparation 
for committee stage is taking up an ever greater amount of opposition time. 
 
 
 
4.    Comparing the impact of bill committees on  government 
legislation 
 
Empirical analysis from the last decade suggests then that bill committees are 
working even harder  than  before: sitting for longer and  processing a much 
higher number  of amendments.  It is therefore pertinent  to consider whether 
this is reflected in the impact committees are making on government legislation; 
are these greater inputs leading to better outputs  in terms of rendering a bill 
‘more generally acceptable’? (McKay et al., 2004). When examining the impact 
of committees on bills, a distinction must be made between the formal acceptance 
or rejection of amendments in committee and the more informal changes which 
may occur, through ministerial undertakings to consider issues further. This may 
be within the confines of a committee itself or in the time between the committee 
stage and the report stage on the floor of the House. 
 
 
 
4.1   Formal changes to government bills 
 
The most obvious means by which to gauge the impact of bill committee scrutiny 
on government legislation is through the number of formal amendments made to 
bills by the opposition and government backbenchers during committee proceed- 
ings. Table 3 summarises the number of amendments agreed to in committee 
during the Griffith study and in the contemporary sample of bills. It suggests 
that despite the increase in the number of non-government  amendments noted 
earlier, the actual number of amendments being agreed to by the government 
minister has fallen dramatically. This is particularly true for successful opposition 
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Table  3  Successful non-government amendments 
 
Sample                   Total  successful amendments             Average per  session 
 
Government 
backbench 
Opposition          Government 
backbench 
Opposition 
 
 
1967 – 1971a 
 
40 
 
131 
 
13 
 
44 
2000 – 2010 33 55 4 6 
aFigures adapted from Griffith (1974), p. 93. 
 
 
Table  4  Substantiveness  of amendments passed in committee 
 
Sample Government 
backbench 
Opposition                      Total 
 
Minor      Significant      Minor      Significant      Minor      Significant 
 
 
1967 – 1971a 
 
30 
 
10 
 
119 
 
12 
 
149 
 
22 
2000 – 2010 19 14 46 9 65 23b 
aFigures adapted from Griffith (1974), pp. 86 – 119. 
bSeven of these  were drawn  from the Hunting Bill Committee (2002 – 2003  session). 
 
 
amendments which averaged 44 in each session analysed by Griffith, but just six 
in the 2000 – 2010 period. 
Simply counting the number of formal amendments, however, gives no indi- 
cation of the extent of the changes made to government bills. One must consider 
how substantive these amendments were. It is very difficult to classify amend- 
ments to bills in terms of substantiveness and Griffith did not  automatically 
code and present amendments  in this way in his work. However, he did seek 
to  highlight  those  amendments  which were important  or  more  substantive 
than others and his detailed summaries of amendments in each of the sessions 
included observations as to the content of amendments agreed to in committee. 
He made a distinction between amendments which were ‘drafting or clarificatory 
or  of very minor  significance’ (1974, p. 112) and  goes into  detail regarding 
amendments  he considers to  be ‘of  importance’ (1974, p. 102). From  these 
descriptions it is possible to divide the successful amendments into two categor- 
ies: minor  and significant. Amendments in the 2000 – 2010 sample have been 
coded in a similar manner. 
Table 4 offers a breakdown of successful amendments under these two levels of 
substantiveness. For both studies it can be concluded that the vast majority of 
non-government  amendments  agreed to  in  committee  covered very simple 
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matters: correcting drafting and spelling mistakes in government bills and clari- 
fying the terms used. This is not to say that such amendments do not serve a 
useful purpose.  Indeed, MPs often feel victorious to  have made even a very 
minor amendment to a bill, describing it as a ‘feeling of success’.15  The number 
of these minor amendments accepted by the government appears has declined 
in the more recent sample, falling to less than  half the number  observed by 
Griffith. 
In both samples a much smaller proportion  of amendments were considered 
to be significant and the difference between the two figures is very slight. The 
most important  amendment  passed in a bill committee in the Griffith (1974) 
sample is probably the removal of the grandpatrial provision within the Immigra- 
tion Bill, agreed to on a division during the 1970 – 1971 session. Griffith describes 
this as a ‘famous parliamentary occasion’ (p. 110) in which government back- 
benchers  joined  with  opposition  MPs  to  defeat  the  government.  A  good 
example of significant amendments being made to a bill in the recent sample is 
the Hunting Bill Committee of the 2002 – 2003 session. One-third of all the sig- 
nificant amendments agreed to between 2000 and 2010 were made during this 
one committee, albeit on a series of free votes. They included the prohibition 
of terrier work underground  and a change in the lower age for hunting licences 
from 18 to 16 years. Other examples include the repeal of Section 28 in the Local 
Government Bill (2002 – 2003 session) and the removal of a ‘get out clause’ from 
the Drugs Bill (2004 – 2005) regarding the dealing of drugs outside schools. Al- 
though  several of these changes were reversed by the  government  at a later 
stage, it illustrates the formal impact that bill committees continue to have on 
government bills, even if this impact is sporadic. 
It must be remembered however that these classifications are only estimates as 
Griffith does not give large amounts of detail on what he considered to constitute 
a minor or an important amendment. However, it seems fair to conclude that in 
terms of formal amendments to bills, there has been a great deal of continuity 
since the 1970s, with the vast majority of successful amendments being simple 
drafting changes. The biggest change is in the frequency of these amendments. 
Ministers today appear to have a greater reluctance to accept even the most 
minor drafting changes. 
 
 
 
4.2   Ministerial undertakings in committee 
 
Examination of the formal changes made to government bills in committee offers 
an interesting comparison. Yet this paints only a partial picture of the work being 
 
15 James Paice, 4th Sitting, Natural Environment and Rural Communities Bill Committee, 23 June 
2005, col. 125. 
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undertaken in committee. When questioned on the number of non-government 
amendments accepted in committees, MPs have noted that undertaking such an 
analysis ‘misses the point, a good part of the time, of what is actually going on’.16 
Some members stated explicitly that the response of the government minister to 
their  amendments  was often ‘more important’17  than  the number  of formal 
amendments passed. This was also noted by Griffith (1974) who describes how 
ministers will often give an oral response to an amendment moved in committee 
which amounts ‘to an undertaking that something will be done substantially to 
satisfy the mover who will then withdraw’ (p. 120). Through these assurances 
and undertakings  from ministers, bill committees can have a more extensive 
impact  on  government  legislation than  is apparent  through  the  counting  of 
formal amendments  alone. Although Griffith noted  the  importance  of such 
undertakings, he only codes these comprehensively for the 1967 – 1968 parlia- 
mentary session. In order to allow a more accurate comparison, the results for 
the 2000 – 2010 sample are displayed as an average per session and an average 
per bill. 
Table 5 displays the breakdown of undertakings from government ministers in 
bill committees. Two features can be identified. Firstly, a slight increase in the 
number  of undertakings  made in which a change has been made elsewhere, 
rising from an average of 1.2 in the Griffith sample to 1.6 today. One could 
point to three potential reasons for this change. It is perhaps linked to the fall 
in the number of formal minor amendments accepted in committee. If a minister 
wishes to see ‘their’ bill leave committee with no non-government amendments, 
it would make sense to agree to small changes to the regulations rather  than 
making them explicit on the face of the bill. Ministers note that there is an ‘ex- 
pectation that you will navigate [a] bill through intact’.18  Agreeing to a change 
in the regulations is a means of placating committee members whilst keeping 
the bill intact. Secondly and linked to this issue is the potential strategy taken 
by ministers to prevent opposition  amendments  being made. One example is 
occasions in which government ministers sign opposition  amendments before 
the start of a bill committee. These amendments will then be listed on the mar- 
shalled list of amendments as government amendments and will be moved by the 
minister in committee, regardless of which MP initially tabled them. This could 
be seen on 11 occasions across the 2000 – 2010 sessions. For example, the govern- 
ment signed an opposition amendment tabled to the Asylum and Immigration 
(Treatment of Claimants) Bill regarding tribunal reviews. The amendment was 
 
 
16 Government backbench MP (3 March 2010), interview with the author. 
 
17 Shadow Minister (4 April 2010), interview with the author. 
 
18 Shadow Minister (19 October 2011), interview with the author. 
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Table  5  Ministerial assurances  and undertakings in bill committees 
 
Ministerial undertaking Sample of bills  
 1967 – 1968a  2000 – 2010  
 Total          Average 
per  bill 
 Total          Average 
per session 
Average 
per  bill 
 
Change  made  elsewhere 
 
44            1.2  
 
223            22 
 
1.6 
Report stage commitment 52            1.4 
 
126            13 0.9 
Commitment to 
reconsider 
190            5.3 
 
642            64 4.6 
NB: includes only the number  of undertakings given by the minister, not the number  of amendments 
concerned. 
aAdapted from Griffith (1974), p. 122. 
 
 
grouped with a series of other related government amendments and passed for- 
mally by the committee. This was only apparent because the MP who had origin- 
ally tabled the amendment,  spoke to  it, saying that  ‘amendment 42 was my 
amendment, and the government have adopted it, with the minister’s signature 
appearing above mine’.19 
Also of note here are occasions in which the government table an amend- 
ment  which  is  identical  or  very similar  to  a  non-government  amendment 
which  has  already  been  tabled.  For  example,  during  the  scrutiny  of  the 
Armed   Forces  (Pensions   and   Consideration)   Bill,  Government   Minister 
David  Lammy  introduced   an  amendment   regarding  appeals  jurisdictions, 
noting that he was ‘grateful to the hon. Member for Aldershot [an opposition 
MP], for his amendment which alerted us to the oversight’.20  Fifty six amend- 
ments over the 2000 – 2010 parliamentary sessions fell into this category. Grif- 
fith’s study does not mention  such practices and it is therefore difficult to say 
whether this is a new phenomenon.  However, the signing of opposition 
amendments  and  tabling  of  identical  amendments  accounts  for  over  one- 
quarter  of  all  the  amendments  in  the  ‘change  made  elsewhere’  category. 
Finally, the greater number of changes being made to the regulations or guid- 
ance accompanying a bill may be the result of the regulations not having been 
drafted at the start of a bill committee. During the committee stage of the Pen- 
sions Bill in the 2003 – 2004 parliamentary session, the Shadow Minister spoke 
 
 
19 Humfrey  Malins,  7th  Sitting,  Asylum  and  Immigration   (Treatment   of  Claimants  etc)  Bill 
Committee, 20 January 2004, col. 233. 
 
20 David  Lammy, 4th  Sitting, Armed  Forces (Pensions  and  Compensation)  Bill Committee,  24 
February 2004, col. 171. 
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of the bill being ‘impenetrable’21  as the accompanying regulations had not yet 
been drafted. Although this hampers the work of committee members some- 
what in terms of their preparation  of amendments  and understanding  of the 
bill, there is perhaps a greater likelihood of ministers agreeing to address an 
issue in the regulations when they have not  yet been compiled. 
The second feature of Table 5 is the fall in the number of ministerial undertak- 
ings to reconsider or reflect on an amendment and in the number of commit- 
ments to table an amendment  at the report stage of the bill. In particular, the 
average number of ministerial commitments to table amendments at the report 
stage has fallen by a third. In the Griffith sample, a total of 52 such commitments 
were recorded over the course of just one parliamentary session, whilst in the 
modern sample only 126 commitments span a full ten-year period. This suggests 
that ministers may be changing the way in which they approach bill committee 
amendments, being more resistant to agreeing to future changes whilst in the 
committee room itself. 
 
 
5.    What does this  comparative data tell  us about contemporary bill 
committees? 
 
The changes to the frequency of formal amendments accepted in bill committees 
and to ministerial assurances and undertakings point to two potential changes in 
the operation of modern bill committees. Firstly, it indicates a possible alteration 
in the attitude of government ministers, with a much lower tendency to accept 
amendments from committee members. Given the much larger number of suc- 
cessful amendments  in the Griffith study, it is assumed that  simple drafting 
amendments were more likely to be accepted by the minister in committee. It 
is difficult to say whether these are completely new changes as there is little an- 
ecdotal evidence within Griffith’s work. 
However, when interviewed, current MPs have frequently highlighted the un- 
willingness of ministers to accept even very minor amendments as they seek to 
‘drive their bill through’22  committee as quickly and easily as possible. Extreme 
ministerial reluctance to accept amendments was demonstrated during the con- 
sideration  of the Planning and  Compulsory Purchase Bill in the 2002 – 2003 
session. The government minister refused to accept two drafting amendments 
moved by the opposition  designed to correct spelling mistakes in the Bill on 
the  grounds  that  he  did  ‘not  have confidence that  there  [were]  only  two 
errors’ and would rather ‘go  through  the Bill to find all the typos, so that we 
 
 
21 Nigel Waterson, 1st Sitting, Pensions Bill Committee, 9 March 2004, col. 7. 
 
22 Opposition MP (24 November 2010), interview with the author. 
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can clean them up in one fell swoop’23  after the committee stage. Despite being 
pressed by the committee members, the Minister refused to accept the amend- 
ments.  The  changes were eventually made,  but  via a  series of  government 
amendments  when the  bill was recommitted  to  bill committee,24   something 
one  Opposition  MP  described  as  ‘childish’  and  ‘a  bit  of  a  game’.25   One 
former minister described the acceptance of amendments in committee as the 
‘ultimate  sign  of  weakness’26  implying  that  they  would  lose face amongst 
their ministerial colleagues and departmental officials should they make conces- 
sions; something that  ‘no government minister  is going to want sitting over 
them’.27  Some even suggest that they feel the need to ‘defend’28  their own de- 
partmental civil servants who have spent time drafting the bill. Others describe 
the tendency to resist amendments as being the result of their ‘ownership’ of the 
bill. In the words of one minister ‘it’s my bill and I want to amend [it] if it needs 
amending’.29 
This is perhaps a response to the long period of Labour Governments with 
substantial parliamentary majorities across the whole of the modern sample of 
bills and an ‘almost legendary’ system of party discipline (Cran, 2005, p. 185), 
As both Flinders (2002) and Kelso (2009) point out, this has underpinned an ex- 
ecutive mentality or dominance which has pervaded all aspects of the legislative 
system. In the bill committee context, it manifests itself in the extreme reluctance 
of the government to accept changes to its own bills, particularly those originat- 
ing from opposition  Members. Additionally, these Labour Governments were 
also governments in which few junior  ministers had experienced any time as 
an opposition  frontbencher. Given that it is junior  ministers who are usually 
given the responsibility of taking bills through committee, this meant that for 
the most part, ministers in bill committees between 2000 and 2010 had no experi- 
ence of being a shadow minister in committee; they had never systematically scru- 
tinised a government bill themselves. This may have shaped their attitude to bill 
committees and the stance taken towards opposition amendments. One minister 
notes that it is ‘enormously  difficult ... [to take a bill through  committee] ... if 
you’ve not  been a shadow minister ... it is difficult simply because you don’t 
 
23 Tony McNulty, 8th Sitting, Planning and Compulsory Purchase Bill Committee, 21 January 2003, 
col. 9. 
24 HC Debates, 10 June 2003, col. 565. 
 
25 Opposition MP (22 October 2010), interview with the author. 
 
26 Former Government Minister (15 December 2010), interview with the author. 
 
27 Government Minister (5 September 2011), interview with the author. 
 
28 Former Government Minister (19 October 2011), interview with the author. 
 
29 Government Minister (3 March 2010), interview with the author. 
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have the empathy and the understanding’.30  This would not have been as evident 
during the Griffith sample which spanned the periods of the Wilson and Heath 
Governments; there was a greater likelihood of serving ministers having prior ex- 
perience of working on the opposition frontbench in bill committees. 
Secondly, the increase in the number of amendments being moved and dis- 
cussed in bill committees suggests changes to the content of government legisla- 
tion since the 1960s and 1970s. Whilst most government amendments are little 
more than ‘technical’ or ‘minor drafting’ changes which are moved and passed 
in a routine  fashion, more  substantive changes are often introduced  to  bills 
during  their passage through  committee. This is perhaps the consequence of 
poorly drafted or hastily written legislation which requires further amendment. 
One long serving MP noted that government bills are ‘often less well prepared’31 
than previously and so invariably requires greater amendment in committee. The 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Bill for example was said to have been ‘re- 
written by the government as they went along’32 during the bill committee. As 
one former minister notes, it shows that ‘the government hasn’t got itself very 
well organised’33 in time for committee stage. 
Alternatively, this increase may simply be a reflection of the growing volume 
and complexity of government legislation. It is commonplace for MPs and aca- 
demics to note the increasingly crowded legislative timetable and the increase 
in the volume of legislation. Korris (2011) notes that whilst the number of bills 
introduced in a given session has seen no significant increase, the actual length 
of modern legislation ‘is significantly  greater than in the past’ (p. 566). Bill com- 
mittees in the 2000 – 2010 sessions have witnessed much disdain from opposition 
MPs regarding the manner in which government legislation is handled. There are 
frequent references to so-called ‘Wallace and Gromit’ or ‘Christmas Tree’ bills 
covering a wide range of departmental  policy and in which it seems—at least 
to  the  participating  Members—that  ‘the  track  is  laid  as  the  committee 
proceeds’.34  This makes legislation more complex for committees to scrutinise 
on  a line-by-line basis. Indeed,  Korris (2011) cites the  Criminal  Justice Act 
2003 as one which was ‘bedevilled by contradictory goals and inconsistent prin- 
ciples’ (p. 567). The 331 government amendments tabled to the bill in committee 
suggest that many drafting errors remained when the bill was first presented to 
 
 
 
30 Government Minister (5 September 2011), interview with the author. 
 
31 Opposition MP (3 November 2010), interview with the author. 
 
32 David Heath, 1st Sitting, Criminal Justice Bill Committee, 17 December 2002, col. 6. 
 
33 Opposition MP (19 October 2011), interview with the author. 
 
34 Kevin Brennan, 1st Sitting, Children and Young Persons [HL] Bill Committee, 24 June 2008, col. 5. 
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Parliament and may also have prompted the 471 non-government amendments 
which were discussed in committee. 
There is one further  possible explanation  for the apparent  decline in the 
impact of bill committees on government bills. The bill committee arena may 
no longer constitute the best place for MPs to make changes to legislation. An 
overwhelming number  of the MPs interviewed highlighted bill committees as 
just one stage in a very long process if one wished to make an amendment to a 
government bill. They cite discussions with ministers outside committee, particu- 
larly in the period between the committee stage and the report stage, as being im- 
portant  in increasing the pressure or momentum  for change. This is seen as a 
crucial time in which to encourage concessions from the government on issues 
and amendments  raised in committee. Similarly, ministers state that they feel 
under considerable pressure to give attention  to those issues upon which they 
gave undertakings in committee. One notes that ‘having given a commitment 
[in committee] you are bound to deliver on it; you can’t just ignore it’35 whilst 
another states that the media and other MPs may have ‘suddenly woken up to 
the fact that  there’s [a]  big issue’36  in the bill, which only became apparent 
during the committee but upon which pressure will be applied between commit- 
tee and report. 
For this reason, Members are often unwilling to push an amendment to a div- 
ision in committee; a friendly and cooperative approach towards the minister is 
seen as a way of encouraging movement on an issue before report. It is more ef- 
fective to ‘mark out [the] territory’37 that you are concerned about during com- 
mittee stage and to continue to build on this as a bill moves towards report. This 
is demonstrated  by Table 6 which highlights the fall in the number of amend- 
ments being divided upon in committee. MPs pushed fewer amendments to a 
division in the whole of the 2000 – 2010 period than during the three sessions ana- 
lysed by Griffith. This is particularly the case for amendments moved by govern- 
ment  backbenchers. The number  of government  backbenchers pushing  their 
amendments to a division has fallen by two-thirds in the recent sample. 
Committee members therefore appear to be adjusting their behaviour in com- 
mittee as a means of achieving changes to government bills at a later stage, outside 
the committee itself. A brief examination of the report stage of these bills demon- 
strates just how productive this apparent change of strategy has been. In total, 
government ministers explicitly referred to 1431 amendments made to legislation 
at the report stage as being prompted by discussions in bill committee, an average 
 
 
35 Former Government Minister (19 October 2011), interview with the author. 
 
36 Former Government Whip (25 June 2010), interview with the author. 
 
37 Opposition MP (4 April 2010), interview with the author. 
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Table  6  Amendments pushed  to division in bill committees 
 
Sample Govern- 
ment BB 
Opposition               Total 
divisions 
Average 
per  bill 
 
 A N  A 
 
N  
 
1967 – 1971a 
 
9 
 
65  
 
13 
 
980 
 
1067 
 
9.6 
2000 – 2010 7 18 
 
5 981 1021 7.3 
A, amendments agreed  to on a division; N, amendments negatived  on a division. 
aData taken  from Griffith (1974), pp. 260 – 266. 
 
 
of over ten amendments for every government bill. By comparison, Griffith (1974) 
notes just 365 government amendments being moved at the report stage in re- 
sponse to undertakings given in committee in the 1967 – 1971 period; an average 
of just three per government bill (pp. 167 – 178). The difference is even greater 
when one considers that the figure for the 2000 – 2010 period includes occasions 
where the government minister himself concedes that an amendment has been 
made in response to committee; the figures listed by Griffith (1974) are his own 
estimation based on the reading of committee debates (p. 206). It is likely then 
that the figure for the current sample is actually much higher, particularly when 
one considers the number of government amendments passed formally without 
debate due to the shortage of time at report. 
Although these concessions made at the report stage are often minor drafting 
points, they are also more likely to contain substantive changes to the bill in ques- 
tion than those agreed to in committee. One could cite for example the measures 
introduced  by the  government  during  the  report  stage of the  Adoption  Bill 
regarding birth  mothers’ access to  their  children’s records, which built  on  a 
debate  introduced  by  the  Opposition  in  committee.  The  shadow  minister 
noted that the change would not have happened ‘had it not been articulated in 
such  a  constructive  way by  us  in  committee’.38   Other  significant  changes 
include those made to the UK Borders Bill, described as ‘a textbook example 
of ... how  the  committee  stage can  improve  a  Bill ... if ministers  are flexible 
enough  to  take  on  board  arguments  made  in  good  faith  by  opposition 
parties’.39  There is also evidence that  MPs have noted  this  change, and  the 
greater likelihood for ministers to reconsider matters at report than to accept 
changes in committee. George Young for example noted in 2002 that under pre- 
vious governments ‘we were not given nearly as many concessions or nearly as 
 
 
38 Opposition MP (4 April 2010), interview with the author. 
 
39 Damian Green, Report Stage, UK Borders Bill, HC Debates, 9 May 2007, col. 194. 
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much sympathy and understanding’.40  Thus, committee stage is increasingly be- 
coming just ‘one part of a broader campaign’41 for MPs looking to make changes 
to government legislation rather than being the primary vehicle for change. In- 
creasingly, the  arena  for  making  an  impact  on  legislature is becoming  the 
period after committee stage. 
 
 
6.    Conclusion 
 
Comparing the work of twenty-first century bill committees with the last com- 
prehensive examination of committee work highlights the key areas of change 
in modern bill committees. Bill committees appear to be working much harder 
than before: spending a greater amount of time engaging in the scrutiny of gov- 
ernment bills and processing a much higher number of both government and 
non-government amendments. Yet this extra work seems to be resulting in less 
material gain in committee itself. Amendments tabled in committee by oppos- 
ition members and by government backbenchers are much less likely to be suc- 
cessful and the frequency of ministerial assurances and undertakings to reflect 
upon  or redraft opposition  amendments  has similarly fallen. MPs themselves 
place the blame for this firmly on the shoulders of government ministers, high- 
lighting the culture of resistance towards the amendment of legislation and of in- 
creasingly complex and hastily drafted bills. 
This does not mean that bill committees are not effective places in which to make 
a difference to government bills. Legislation such as the Hunting Bill has seen im- 
portant  amendments  agreed to in committee and the introduction  of oral and 
written evidence from 2006 shows how important committee stage is still consid- 
ered to be for thorough legislative scrutiny. However, the period between the com- 
mittee  and  report  stage is becoming increasingly important.  A much  greater 
number of amendments are introduced by the government at the report stage in 
response  to  bill committees.  Whilst  one  could  still agree with  John  Griffith 
(1974) that ‘the impact of Parliament on government bills is by no means negligible’ 
(p. 256), it is perhaps more negligible in bill committees today than in previous 
years. Bill committees remain an enduring feature of legislative scrutiny, but are in- 
creasingly just one step along the road to achieving changes to government bills. 
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